USA v. Justine Wright by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-1-2011 
USA v. Justine Wright 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Justine Wright" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 973. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/973 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 










JUSTINE WRIGHT,  
     Appellant 
_______________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. No. 09-cr-635-02) 




April 14, 2011 
 
Before:   FISHER, JORDAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges. 
 






Brett G. Sweitzer   [ARGUED] 
Mark T. Wilson 
Defender Association of Philadelphia 
Federal Court Division 
501 Walnut Street - #540 West 
Philadelphia, PA   19106 
          Counsel for Appellant 
 
Maria M. Carrillo 
Robert A. Zauzmer   [ARGUED] 
Office of United States Attorney 
615 Chestnut Street - #1250 
Philadelphia, PA   19106 
          Counsel  for Appellee 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 





 appeals the judgment entered by the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania sentencing him to 20 months’ imprisonment.  
Wright argues that the sentence was procedurally 
unreasonable due to the erroneous application of an 8-level 
                                              
1
 In the record and briefs, Wright is referred to as both 
“Justin Wright” and “Justine Wright.”  We use “Justine” here, 
as that name was used by Wright in his notice of appeal. 
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enhancement.  Although the District Court’s rationale for 
applying the 8-level enhancement was thoughtful and well-
explained, we agree with Wright that the enhancement should 
not have been applied in this case and will therefore vacate 
and remand for resentencing.  
  
A. Factual History 
 
On July 2, 2009, Wright approached Andrew Cella at 
Cella’s pizza restaurant in Morgantown, Pennsylvania, to 
inquire about purchasing the restaurant.  Cella told Wright 
that he would sell the restaurant for $400,000.  Wright said he 
did not have the money right then but that he would return 
later with his brother, who did have the money.  On July 6, 
2009, Wright returned to the restaurant accompanied by Soko 
Kanneh, who Wright falsely identified as his brother.  Wright 
and Kanneh renewed Wright’s earlier offer, and Cella again 
told them he would sell the restaurant for $400,000.  Wright 
and Kanneh told Cella that they had the money, informing 
him that their father had made “good money” as a political 
figure and head of Sierra Leone’s National Bank.  Their 
father, they said, had recently been assassinated, and they had 
fled to the United States as refugees.  Cella was interested in 
their offer, and they agreed to meet again for dinner to discuss 
the details.   
 
Several days later, Cella met Wright and Kanneh for 
dinner at their hotel in Philadelphia.  After dinner, Kanneh 
told Cella that he wanted to show him something, and the 
three men went to Cella’s car.  Once in the car, Kanneh 
removed a stack of black paper from a bag along with a 
plastic plate and several small bottles of liquid.  Kanneh told 
Cella that the black paper was U.S. currency that had been 
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given to Sierra Leone by the United States as aid but had been 
dyed black to keep it from being used by any rebels who 
might intercept it.  He explained that the black dye could only 
be removed by a special solvent.  Kanneh and Wright told 
Cella that their father had been responsible for cleaning the 
money for the Sierra Leone government and that, after he 
died, they had brought the money with them to the United 
States.   
 
As Kanneh and Wright told Cella about the black 
money, Kanneh demonstrated the cleaning process by placing 
two black pieces of paper in the plastic plate, coating them 
with liquid from one of the bottles, and then “slosh[ing] 
[them] around on the plate like he was panning for gold.”  
(App. at  93.)  As Kanneh did this, the paper “started to clean 
up” and “bec[ame] clearer and clearer.”  (Id.)  Once the 
pieces of paper were clean, they were revealed as two genuine 
$100 bills.  Kanneh told Cella that he and Wright had 
millions of dollars in black bills in their hotel room but that 
they needed large amounts of money in order to buy the 
solvent to clean the bills.  Kanneh and Wright then offered to 
sell Cella $120,000 worth of black bills and the necessary 
solvent to clean them for $60,000.   
 
Although Cella told Wright and Kanneh that he would 
try to raise the $60,000, he instead contacted the police, who 
put Cella in touch with the U.S. Secret Service.  At the behest 
of Secret Service Agent Matt Cimino, Cella contacted Wright 
and Kanneh to arrange another meeting, telling them he had a 
friend who also wanted to invest in the black money.  Wright 
and Kanneh agreed to another meeting but stated that if there 
was a second investor, they wanted $100,000, for which they 
would deliver $200,000 worth of black money.  Cella 
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arranged for Agent Cimino and himself to meet Wright and 
Kanneh on August 26, 2009, in a Philadelphia hotel room.  
There, Wright and Kanneh repeated their earlier 
demonstration for Agent Cimino, cleaning two genuine $100 
bills that had been dyed black.  They then showed Agent 
Cimino a suitcase full of black paper, which they claimed was 
$200,000 worth of “black money” but which was actually 
plain black construction paper.  They told Agent Cimino that 
they had sufficient cleaning solution with them to clean all 
$200,000 and that they would sell Agent Cimino the money 
and the cleaning solution for $100,000.  Following that 
performance and offer, Wright and Kanneh were arrested.   
 
B. Procedural History 
 
On September 24, 2009, Wright and Kanneh were 
charged with two counts of possessing and passing altered 
currency, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472; two counts of 
possessing false or fictitious items, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 514(a)(2); and one count of conspiring to do the same, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371.  After Kanneh pled guilty, 
Wright proceeded to trial.  At the conclusion of the evidence, 
the District Court entered an order of acquittal for the two 
§ 514(a)(2) charges, after which the jury convicted Wright on 
the remaining charges of possession of altered currency and 
conspiracy. 
 
In preparation for a sentencing hearing on June 29, 
2010, a presentence investigation report recommended an 
offense level of 17, calculated by taking a base offense level 
of 9, pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines 
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(“U.S.S.G.” or the “Guidelines”) § 2B5.1(a),2 and adding to it 
an 8-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1(b)(1).  
Section 2B5.1(b)(1) states: 
 
If the face value of the counterfeit items (A) 
exceeded $2,000 but did not exceed $5,000, 
increase by 1 level; or (B) exceeded $5,000, 
increase by the number of levels from the table 
in §2B1.1 (Theft, Property Destruction, and 
Fraud) corresponding to that amount. 
 
The table in § 2B1.1, in turn, calls for an 8-level enhancement 
for amounts between $70,000 and $120,000. 
 
 Wright objected to the application of the 8-level 
enhancement, arguing that § 2B5.1(b)(1) called for any 
enhancement to be based on “the face value of the counterfeit 
items,” which all parties acknowledged was $400, that is, the 
four $100 bills used in the demonstrations.  The District Court 
overruled Wright’s objection, concluding that, despite 
§ 2B5.1(b)(1) referencing only the “face value of the 
counterfeit items,” the enhancement could be applied based 
on the loss Wright intended to cause.  The Court explained: 
 
I don’t think that there is any question that the 
sentencing commission never anticipated the 
                                              
2
 U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1, which covers conspiracy 
convictions under § 371, directs the sentencing court to use 
the base offense level from the Guideline provision applicable 
to the substantive crime, which, in this case, is § 2B5.1.  As a 
result, Wright’s conviction for conspiracy under § 371 did not 
alter the base offense level. 
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situation that we have before us.  This is 
something new.  Okay.  And I am confident that 
had it been presented with such a case as this, 
that it would focus on what the intended loss 
was as opposed to the actual altered 
currency. …  What they were using here is a 
scam and I believe that if the commission were 
to consider it, that they would calculate the 
offense level based upon the total loss.  And 
therefore, I am going to deny your request to 
change that. 
 
(App. at 312-13.) 
 
Based on that calculated offense level of 17 and a 
criminal history category of III, the recommended Guidelines 
sentence was 30 to 37 months’ imprisonment.  After 
analyzing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the Court varied 
downward, and imposed a sentence of 20 months’ 
imprisonment and three-years’ supervised release.3  In doing 
so, the Court stated that the sentence it imposed was the same 
as it would have imposed even if the 8-level enhancement 
pursuant to § 2B5.1(b)(1) did not apply.   
 
Wright’s timely appeal followed.   
 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
                                              
3
 Neither party has objected to the variance under 
§ 3553(a), and, therefore, it is not discussed herein. 
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U.S.C. § 3231, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3742(b) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 
In sentencing a defendant, district courts follow a 
three-step process:  At step one, the court calculates the 
applicable Guidelines range, United States v. Tomko, 562 
F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2009), which includes the application 
of any sentencing enhancements, United States v. Shedrick, 
493 F.3d 292, 298 n.5 (3d Cir. 2007).  At step two, the court 
considers any motions for departure and, if granted, states 
how the departure affects the Guidelines calculation.  Tomko, 
562 F.3d at 567.  At step three, the court considers the 
recommended Guidelines range together with the statutory 
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determines the 
appropriate sentence, which may vary upward or downward 
from the range suggested by the Guidelines.  Tomko, 562 F.3d 
at 567. 
 
Our review of a criminal sentence is for abuse of 
discretion and proceeds in two stages.  Id.  First, we review 
for procedural error at any sentencing step, including, for 
example, failing to make a “correct computation of the 
Guidelines range” at step one, United States v. Langford, 516 
F.3d 205, 214 (3d Cir. 2008), failing to rely on “appropriate 
bases for departure” at step two, United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 
136, 148 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted), or 
failing to give “meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) 
factors” at step three, United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 
215 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
4
  If we 
                                              
4
 The Supreme Court’s decision in Gall v. United 
States lists a number of potential procedural errors, “such as 
9 
 
find procedural error at any step, we will generally “remand 
the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.”  Id. at 
214.   
 
If there is no procedural error, the second stage of our 
review is for substantive reasonableness, and “we will affirm 
[the sentence] unless no reasonable sentencing court would 
have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant 
for the reasons the district court provided.”  Tomko, 562 F.3d 




On appeal, Wright argues that the District Court 
committed procedural error at step one by imposing an 8-
level enhancement for intended loss under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2B5.1(b)(1).  He says that, because § 2B5.1(b)(1) sets forth 
an enhancement based only on “the face value of the 
counterfeit items,” applying the enhancement based on 
intended loss was an abuse of discretion.  We agree that 
intended loss is not an aspect of § 2B5.1(b)(1), though we do 
not accept all of Wright’s reasoning.   
 
Both in his briefs and at oral argument, Wright argued 
that the District Court had the option of applying § 2B5.1 
with its base offense level of 9 but no enhancement, or 
                                                                                                     
failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines 
range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to 
consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on 
clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the 
chosen sentence – including an explanation for any deviation 
from the Guidelines range.”  552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 
10 
 
applying § 2B1.1 “in toto” with a base offense level of 6 and 
an enhancement based on intended loss.  However, the 
assertion that either § 2B5.1 or § 2B1.1 could be applied 
under these circumstances is incorrect.  Wright was convicted 
of altering four $100 bills in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472.  
While the statutory index to the Guidelines states that either 
§ 2B5.1 or § 2B1.1 may be applied for convictions under 
§ 472, the index further instructs that “[i]f more than one 
guideline section is referenced for the particular statute, use 
the guideline most appropriate for the offense conduct 
charged in the count of which defendant was convicted.”  See 
U.S.S.G. app. A.  Here, § 2B5.1 states that it applies to 
offenses involving “Counterfeit Bearer Obligations of the 
United States,” whereas § 2B1.1 applies to offenses involving 
“Counterfeit Instruments Other than Counterfeit Bearer 
Obligations of the United States.”  The Guidelines define 
“bearer obligations of the United States” as obligations “not 
made out to a specific payee,” including, among other things 
“currency and coins,” and define counterfeiting to include 
altering.  U.S.S.G. § 2B5.1 cmt. n.1, 2.  Accordingly, because 
the “offense conduct” Wright was charged with was altering 
“bearer obligations of the United States,” namely $400 in 
United States currency, § 2B5.1 is the appropriate base 
Guideline to apply in this case. 
 
The District Court thus properly applied § 2B5.1 and 
its base offense level of 9.  Then, relying on the instruction in 
§ 2B5.1(b)(1) to increase the offense level according to the 
table in § 2B1.1“if the face value of the counterfeit 
items … exceeded $5,000,” the Court concluded that, because 
the intended loss for Wright’s scheme was $100,000, it 
should increase the offense level by 8, the number indicated 
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in the § 2B1.1 table for values greater than $70,000 and less 
than or equal to $120,000.   
 
While we have never addressed whether § 2B5.1(b)(1) 
supports an enhancement for intended loss, the language of 
that section directs any enhancement to be based on face 
value only.  The government concedes that point, 
acknowledging that § 2B5.1(b)(1) does not support a step-one 
enhancement based on intended loss.  The government’s only 
argument on appeal is that the District Court did not apply a 
step-one enhancement but, instead, made a step-two upward 
departure.  The government points to U.S.S.G. 
§ 5K2.0(a)(2)(B), which allows upward departures where 
“there is present a circumstance that the Commission has not 
identified.”  Although the Court never used the word 
“departure,” the government argues that the Court’s statement 
that “the sentencing commission never anticipated the 
situation that we have before us” invoked § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B) 
and should be viewed as a departure.   
 
 We do not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that 
“the sentencing commission never anticipated the situation” 
presented by this case.  (App. at 312.)  Indeed, the primary 
harm in a scheme of the sort at issue here is the amount 
sought by the fraud, not the nominal value of the currency 
defaced to perpetrate the fraud.  Thus, by focusing on the 
value of the defaced currency, § 2B5.1 does not address the 
gravamen of the harm, as the District Court quite rightly 
pointed out.
5
  A step-two upward departure for unidentified 
                                              
5
 We note that, because of its focus on the face value 
of the counterfeit items, rather than intended loss, § 2B5.1 
would not distinguish between a black money scheme that 
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circumstances under § 5K2.0(a)(2)(B) would therefore be 
justified, as would a step-three upward variance under 
§ 3553(a)(2)(A) “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,” 
and the District Court might have legitimately reached the 
imposed sentence or a similar one through either or both of 
those procedural mechanisms.   
 
Nonetheless, despite the government’s argument to the 
contrary, that is not what the Court did.  The record plainly 
shows that the District Court imposed a step-one 
enhancement.  The Court overruled Wright’s objection to the 
application of the 8-level enhancement and stated that “the 
offense level will remain at 17.”  (App. at 313.)  As Wright 
correctly notes, “[i]f the district court had imposed a step-two 
departure, the court would have sustained Mr. Wright’s 
objection to the enhancement, identified the applicable 
Guidelines range as 8-14 months, and then proceeded to 
upwardly depart from that range.  Instead, the court squarely 
overruled Mr. Wright’s objection.”  (Reply Brief for 
Appellant at 3 (emphasis in original).)  Furthermore, the 
government never made a motion for an upward departure, 
nor did the District Court so much as mention the word 
“departure.”  There is simply no basis in the record to 
conclude that the District Court did anything other than apply 
a step-one enhancement for intended loss based on 
§ 2B5.1(b)(1).  Because § 2B5.1(b)(1) requires any 
enhancement to be based on the face value of the counterfeit 
                                                                                                     
attempted to defraud a victim of $1,000 and one that 
attempted to defraud a victim of $1,000,000.  Plainly, the 
sentencing commission did not have this kind of scheme in 
mind when they penned § 2B5.1. 
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items, the District Court erred in imposing an enhancement 
based on intended loss. 
 
We acknowledge that a “form over substance” 
criticism can be leveled at that conclusion, but we are bound 
to follow what we perceive to be the plain meaning of the 
Guidelines.  Furthermore, in the sentencing context it is 
firmly established that form – i.e. procedure – and substance 
are both of high importance.   We have a responsibility “to 
ensure that a substantively reasonable sentence has been 
imposed in a procedurally fair way.”  United States v. 
Levinson, 543 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Merced, 
603 F.3d at 214-15 (“[T]he broad substantive discretion 
afforded district courts … makes adherence to procedural 
sentencing requirements all the more important.”).  And, of 
course, our recognition that the District Court could reach this 
same result by use of a departure or variance does not mean 
that that result is compelled.  On remand, Wright will have 
the opportunity to argue that neither a departure nor a 
variance is warranted, something he was unable to do in the 
first instance.  We cannot say whether the District Court will 
be persuaded by those arguments and, thus, cannot say 
whether the resulting sentence on remand will be identical to 
that already imposed.
6
   
                                              
6
 The District Court’s statement that it would have 
imposed the same sentence whether or not it had applied the 
8-level enhancement does not affect our disposition.  We 
have previously held that a statement by a sentencing court 
that it would have imposed the same sentence even absent 
some procedural error does not render the error harmless 
unless that “alternative sentence” was, itself, the product of 
the three step sentencing process.  United States v. Smalley, 
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Although the identified error requires that we vacate 
and remand, we emphasize again our agreement with the 
District Court’s conclusion that § 2B5.1 does not address the 
circumstances of this case.  As we have already noted, the 
focus of § 2B5.1 on face value fails to capture the seriousness 
of Mr. Wright’s crime, and we endorse the District Court’s 
efforts to ensure that the sentence imposed is adequate in light 
of all relevant circumstances.  We remand solely because 
those circumstance needed to be addressed at steps two or 
three of the sentencing process, rather than through the 





For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate Wright’s 
sentence and remand for resentencing.
7
 
                                                                                                     
517 F.3d 208, 214-16 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, the District Court 
said only that it would have imposed the same sentence even 
absent the 8-level enhancement, without explaining what the 
Guidelines range would have been without the enhancement, 
and without explaining why an upward departure or variance 
would be merited from that range.  As the government 
concedes, that alternative sentence is procedurally insufficient 
and does not render the error here harmless. 
7
 Wright completed serving the 20-month sentence on 
February 8, 2011.  The case is not moot, however, because 
Wright is still serving his period of supervised release and if, 
on remand, the District Court imposes a sentence of 
imprisonment less than the 20 months served, Wright may 
receive credit against his supervised release period for the 
excess months of imprisonment.  See United States v. 
15 
 
                                                                                                     
Cottman, 142 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that a 
sentencing appeal was not mooted by the prisoner’s release 
because if “the appropriate sentencing range [was] 
reduced … . [it] would likely merit a credit against [the 
prisoner’s] period of supervised release for the excess period 
of imprisonment”). 
